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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, environmental concerns regarding the inade-
quate treatment of hazardous waste have escalated. State govern-
ments' general laissez faire approach to the problem, coupled
with the public's "NIMBYistic"' attitude, have resulted in increas-
1. The NIMBY or "not in my backyard" attitude often abrogates govern-
ment attempts to implement hazardous waste management facilities. Generally,
the public fear is motivated by a lack of full understanding of the underlying
(149)
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ing levels of illegally disposed hazardous waste thus prompting
the need for harsher federal legislation.
In 1986, Congress responded to this situation by enacting
amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 Specifically, section
104(c)(9) of the Superfund Reauthorization Act (SARA) 3 is in-
tended to force states to aggressively assume a greater responsi-
bility in hazardous waste clean-up efforts. This section mandates
that each state establish the capability to meet a capacity assur-
ance plan (CAP) for a twenty year period.4
While the amended statute constitutes a positive step toward
addressing the growing problems associated with hazardous
waste, confusion exists about how much leeway section 104(c)(9)
actually accords to the states. For instance, in an effort to achieve
the individual capacity in accordance with CERCLA, some states
have recently imposed waste import bans. Such state action has
raised the issue of the Commerce Clause 5 as that clause seeks to
guarantee free movement among states. In the general context of
waste import bans, section 104(c)(9)'s laudable goal may conflict
with the purposes of the Commerce Clause.
Many recent cases addressing this difficult issue have relied
upon the 1978 Supreme Court decision in The City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey6 which struck down a total state-imposed disposal
ban. 7 This Comment discusses City of Philadelphia's broad impact
on Commerce Clause challenges arising subsequent to the pro-
mulgation of section 104(c)(9). Particular emphasis will be placed
on the more specific issue of whether a partial ban on the impor-
tation of hazardous waste violates the Commerce Clause. It will
be argued that partial waste bans are consistent with the spirit of
SARA section 104(c)(9) and are distinguishable from the total
issues. For further discussion of the NIMBY syndrome, see Delogu, "NIMBY"
is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D.L. REV. 198 (1990).
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
CERCLA].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as Superfund
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104, 100 Stat. 1613, 1782).
For the full text of § 104(c)(9), see infra note 17.
4. id.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Specifically, the Commerce Clause provides
as follows: "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States .... Id.
6. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
7. For further discussion of City of Philadelphia, see infra notes 32-43 and
accompanying text.
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waste bans at issue in the leading Supreme Court decision, City of
Philadelphia. To support this argument, primary focus will be
placed on a recent Alabama case, National Solid Waste Management
Ass 'n v. Alabama Dep' of Envtl. Protection,8 (NSWMA II), in which
the Eleventh Circuit struck down a partial ban on hazardous
waste.
Part II of this Comment considers the historical background
of SARA section 104(c)(9). Part III outlines the scope of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause and some relevant exceptions. Part IV
discusses the background of the recent Alabama case and the rea-
soning employed by the district and circuit courts respectively.
Finally, Part V will analyze and critique the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in an effort to bolster the basic thesis of this Comment
supporting the legality of partial, hazardous waste import bans.
II. BACKGROUND OF CERCLA SECTION 104(c)(9)
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 in order to implement plans
for the more efficient clean-up of hazardous waste. 9 CERCLA's
directives, designed to establish more efficient disposal programs,
were, however, impeded by political pressures and public opposi-
tion.' 0 The "broader social need for (more) hazardous waste
management facilities" was significantly ignored by most state
and local governments. " Consequently, there was no increase in
hazardous waste disposal capacity. As a result, Section 104(c)(9)
of SARA was promulgated with the intent to stimulate develop-
ment of hazardous waste facilities and to encourage states to
assume greater responsibility in clean-up efforts. Beginning Oc-
tober 17, 1989,12 each state has been required to establish ade-
8. 729 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1990), vacated, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir.),
modified on denial of reh 'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, Alabama Dep't of
Envtl. Management v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 2800
(1991). National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 932 F.2d 979 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991). For further discussion of the Eleventh
Circuit decision and the prior district court opinion, see infra notes 95-156 and
accompanying text.
9. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
10. See S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 23 (1985) (number of obsta-
cles to siting new hazardous waste management facilities).
11. Id. at 22.
12. This date followed the enactment of the provision by three years so that
states would have adequate time to comply with the statute. See EPA Draft Haz-
ardous Waste Capacity Assurance Guidance, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,651-52 (1988)
(noted in Jonathan R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State
Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1, 5 (1990)[hereinafter
Stone]). (This article describes new ideas for how to best implement § 104(c)(9)).
1992]
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quate capacity to dispose of endogenous waste for the next
twenty years.' 3 In the event that a state lacks the individual capac-
ity to handle its domestic waste, section 104(c)(9) provides that
the state' 4 must, through interstate agreements, secure the dispo-
sition of waste it is unable to treat.' 5 Those states which fail to
satisfy capacity assurance requirements will be ineligible to re-
ceive funds for "remedial actions"' 16 provided for by the
Superfund.
Section 104(c)(9)' 7 suggests that greater deference will be
Alternate methods for implementation had been drafted by the National
Governors Association (NGA) which suggests that interstate or regional agree-
ments be implemented over a four-year adjustment period. The EPA's CAP
submissions were more substantially finalized plans. Id. at 6. The NGA guide-
lines would monitor states who were exporting a significant amount of waste.
The NGA approach to high volume exports is as follows:
High exports would be unreasonable, if the state had neither increased
any feasible interstate disposal facilities nor entered into any interstate
export agreements. If the state was still unreasonably exporting at the
end of the four-year adjustment period, then EPA would allow its coun-
terpart importing state to bar those imports, without penalty. How-
ever, the exporting state's CAP [capacity assurance plans] would be
disproved, thereby incurring the Section 104(c)(9) remedial cleanup
funding sanctions.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
13. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
(originally enacted as Superfund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 104,100 Stat. 1613) (codified in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(Supp. IV 1986)).
14. Most, if not all, states lack the individual capacity to handle all of their
hazardous waste.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 9 (1985). This
report states that the purpose of long-term provisions is "to ensure the contin-
ued effectiveness of response actions to be taken over an extended period within
a state insofar as response activities paid for out of the Fund are concerned." Id.
16. "CERCLA provides for two types of cleanup actions: remedial actions,
which are generally long-term or permanent containment or disposal programs,
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24); and removal efforts, which are usually short-term cleanup
arrangements of a more immediate nature, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)." NSWMA H,
910 F.2d at 716 (emphasis added).
17. Section 104(c)(9) states as follows:
(9) Siting - Effective 3 years after October 17, 1986, the President
shall not provide any remedial actions pursuant to this section unless
the State in which the release occurs first enters into a contract or coop-
erative agreement with the President providing assurances deemed ad-
equate by the President that the State will assure the availability of
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities which -
(A) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure
disposition of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be
generated within the State during the 20-year period following the date
of such contract or cooperative agreement and to be disposed of,
treated, or destroyed,
(B) are within the State or outside the State in accordance with an
interstate agreement or regional agreement or authority,
4
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given to states in the area of hazardous waste management.18 Not
all state actions in response to section 104(c)(9), however, have
been welcomed with open arms. A problematic area, for exam-
ple, has arisen in the implementation of waste import bans. Such
actions have been challenged as violations of the Supremacy
Clause' 9 and the Commerce Clause. The debate over whether
(C) are acceptable to the President, and
(D) are in compliance with the requirement of subtitle C of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (Supp. V 1987).
18. Former EPA Administrator Lee Thomas articulated the importance of
the role of states in the success of Superfund.
19. Challenges to state bans under the Supremacy Clause often are made
concurrently with Commerce Clause claims. Although not specifically consid-
ered in this Comment, it is important to briefly consider whether waste disposal
bans are preempted by federal legislation, namely The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 [hereinafter RCRA], Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (West Supp. 1988)) and CERCLA.
An initial question to be considered in a preemption context is whether the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941). In fields where federal and state law conflict, the Supremacy Clause di-
rects that state law be preempted. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
In the context of hazardous waste, the Supreme Court has recognized that
there exists "no 'clear [or] manifest purpose of Congress' to preempt the entire
field of interstate waste management or transportation, either by express statu-
tory command or by implicit legislative design." City of Philadelphia, supra note 6,
at 620 n.4. Moreover, legislative history clearly suggests that states may impose
"more stringent requirements in the field of waste management." RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-91, 6929 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), as amended by Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 14. According to Sena-
tor Bumpers, who is a proponent of active state involvement, the "more
stringent" state requirement was added to RCRA in 1980 since the original ver-
sion did "not give states the opportunity to set standards more stringent than
those provided by Federal authorities in establishing sites for waste disposal fa-
cilities." 125 CONG. REC. 13248 (1978).
The legislative history, however, does not clearly reflect how far a state may
go to meet the requirements of federal mandates. The regulations suggest that
there are limitations on state interference with interstate commerce. See Require-
ments for Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 271, 4(a); see
also Stone, supra note 13, at 8-14; see also Jonathan T. Cain, Routes and Roadblocks:
State Controls on Hazardous Waste Imports, 23 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 767 (1983)[herein-
after Cain].
The Eighth Circuit, in Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1986)
recently refused to allow a county to enact an ordinance which abrogated the
incineration of a particular hazardous waste in the county. Id. The court stated
that the savings clause only permits local governments to "make good-faith ad-
aptations of federal policy to local conditions." Id. at 745.
In Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436 (S.D. Cal.
1988) another federal court rejected the argument that the local ban was pre-
empted. One author, commenting on these two recent cases, noted as follows:
[the] RCRA Section 3009 savings clause did not save local waste import
bans from preemption when such bans would impair the objectives of
special federal programs. For instance, in Ensco a local ban on incinera-
tors would have thwarted EPA's determination that ... wastes are best
1992]
5
Fixl: Hazardous Waste and Partial Import Bans: An Environmentally Sound
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
154 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 149
section 104(c)(9) accords states the authority to interfere with ex-
ogenous waste has thus far not been definitively resolved by Con-
gress, the Courts or EPA.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Justice Cardozo, addressing the rationale of the dormant
Commerce Clause, once opined that "the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together." 20 According to Cardozo's
analysis, the rationale for the Commerce Clause is to prevent eco-
nomic balkanization by the states. Generally, states may not re-
strict the free flow of commerce for economic purposes. 2' In the
context of exogenous waste, Lawrence Tribe, borrowing one of
Cardozo's often-quoted lines, stated that the states must " 'sink
or swim together' even in their collective garbage." '22
The implicit constitutional limitations upon a state's ability to
interfere with interstate commerce have evolved expressly from
several Supreme Court decisions. 23 A two step test has emerged
which determines whether challenged legislation violates the
Commerce Clause.
Courts first focus on whether the challenged state legislation
is evenhanded 24 in its application and "rationally related to a le-
disposed of by incineration. One might argue that the CERCLA Sec-
tion 104(c)(9) waste capacity assurance interstate agreements are a spe-
cial program which likewise preempts state or local import bans.
However, that leads to the awkward juxtaposition of two federal waste
programs, one for radioactive waste and one for hazardous waste, both
relying on interstate compacts but one encouraging import bans and
one prohibiting import bans. There ought to be a resolution to this
apparent conflict of congressional policies.
Stone, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 28-29.
20. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
21. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976). Specifi-
cally, "[s]tate lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of... [goods] .. .in
response to the economic laws of supply and demand." Id. However, the above
case is distinguishable on the basis of the market participant exception. For a
brief discussion of the market participant exception, see infra note 50.
22. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 426 (1978)[here-
inafter TRIBE].
23. The Constitution grants an affirmative power for Congress "[t]o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8. The implicit negative limitations on states have generally been set
forth through Supreme Court case law. This implicit nature also leaves the
Supreme Court's analysis open to Congressional revision. TRIBE, supra note 22.
24. Once challenged legislation is found to be evenhanded in application, it
will generally be less severely scrutinized under a balancing test articulated in
the leading case, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142-46 (1970). Under
the Pike balancing test, "'[f]acially evenhanded legislation" may be found to have
a "discriminatory effect only where the state law advantages in-state business in
6
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gitimate state [interest]." '25 If the statute withstands this primary
analysis, the courts will then apply a less burdensome balancing
test. Under this balancing test, the court must consider whether
the local benefits derived from the statute exceed the burden
placed upon interstate commerce as a result of the statute. 26 If
so, the statute is likely to pass constitutional muster.
A. Strict Per Se Discrimination Rule
The Supreme Court 27 has consistently struck down legisla-
tion which facially discriminates against out-of-state business in
order to serve parochial, economic interests. 28 To that end, a
facially discriminatory statute will be held unconstitutional as a
per se violation 29 of the Commerce Clause if it serves a protec-
tionist purpose °30 In order to withstand constitutional attack,
relation to out-of-state business in the same market." Norfolk Southern Corp. v.
Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 1987)(cited in J: Filiberto Sanitation v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also New
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). See generally Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1091, 1095 (1986) ("[N]otjust any purpose to advantage local economic
actors at the expense of foreign actors is protectionist. The purpose must be to
advantage local actors at the expense of their foreign competitors."). Id.
25. If this test fails, the challenged state action will most likely be struck
down as a per se violation. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 408. See generally Roger W.
Andersen, The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 3
Wis. L. REV. 635, 707 (1978).
26. Pike, 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See supra note 24.
27. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126, reh'g denied,
Shell Oil Co. v. Governors of Md., 439 U.S. 884 (1978).
28. Id. It is important to note that the mere fact that a state regulation may
burden some interstate companies is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish a
Commerce Clause claim. In Exxon, the Court upheld a Maryland statute which
precluded producers or refiners of petroleum from operating retail service sta-
tions within Maryland. Lawrence Tribe, in analyzing the Exxon holding, noted
that "the negative implications of the commerce clause derive principally from a
political theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade. The function
of the clause is to ensure national solidarity, not economic efficiency." TRIBE,
supra note 22, at 417 (footnote omitted). Id.
29. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. at 573, 579 (1986)(statute which favors local economic interest "generally
struck down . . .without further inquiry").
30. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). In Baldwin, the
Court determined that New York's attempt to protect its dairy farmers by en-joining out-of-state producers from undercutting New York dairy farmers' prices
was intended as economic discrimination and was, thus, invalid. Id. Accordingly,
the Court reasoned that "[i]f New York, in order to promote the economic wel-
fare of her farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices
of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant
to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the
nation." Id. at 522.
7
Fixl: Hazardous Waste and Partial Import Bans: An Environmentally Sound
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
156 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 149
such facial discrimination must advance a nonprotectionist pur-
pose that cannot adequately be served by nondiscriminatory alter-
natives. 3' Moreover, a statute's discriminatory means as well as
its goals are subject to the Court's heightened scrutiny. 32
The leading case addressing discriminatory waste import
bans under the purview of the Commerce Clause is The City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.3 3 In that case, a New Jersey statute
which banned the importation of solid waste destined for New
Jersey landfills was challenged as violative of the Commerce
Clause.3 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the chal-
lenged act satisfied the Commerce Clause test since it was moti-
vated by a legitimate public interest in protecting the
environment.3 5
The United States Supreme Court then reversed on the
grounds that the statute was, in fact, discriminatory.3 6 Since the
31. Robert Meltz, State Discrimination Against Imported Solid Waste: Constitu-
tional Roadblocks, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10383 (September 1990)
[hereinafter Meltz]. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278-79
(1988).
32. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 ("[Tlhe evil of protectionism can
reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends"). Id. For discussion of City
of Philadelphia, see infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
33. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
34. The New Jersey statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person shall bring into this state, or accept for disposal on this
state, any solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected
outside the territorial limits of this state. This section shall not apply
to:
1) Garbage to be fed to swine in the State of New Jersey;
2) Any separated waste material, including newsprint, paper, glass
and metals, that is free form . . . and not mixed with other solid or
liquid waste that is intended for a recycling or reclamation facility;...
destined for a waste recycling facility].
3) Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable sec-
ondary materials, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility
4) Pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste.., which is to be treated,
processed or received in a solid waste disposal facility which is regis-
tered with the Department for such treatment, processing or recovery,
other than disposal on or in the lands of this state.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. § 7:1-4.2 (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). Cf. Cain, supra
note 19, at 774-75.
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-9 (West 1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court
relied on the following relevant language in the Act:
[T]he environment continues to be threatened by the treatment and
disposal of waste which originated or was collected outside the State,
and that the public health, safety and welfare require that the treatment
and disposal within this State of all wastes generated outside the State
be prohibited.
Id. See also City of Philadelphia, supra note 6, at 625.
36. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
8
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court found that the statute was protectionist in nature, the stat-
ute was invalidated.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart focused exclusively
on the initial Commerce Clause inquiry: whether the act was "a
protectionist measure, or whether it ... [was] ... viewed as a law
directed to legitimate local concerns."37 In holding that the latter
description applied, he decided that the "ultimate legislative pur-
pose"38 would be irrelevant to a Commerce Clause analysis of a
discriminatory statute. Justice Stewart's memorable holding
stated that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends."3 9
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist sharply disagreed
with the majority's classification of solid waste as an ordinary ob-
ject of commerce. 40 Instead he stated that the quarantine excep-
tion was applicable to solid waste imports. 4 1 Rehnquist labeled
the majority's distinction between certain "inherently dangerous"
articles and those which "simply pile up in an ever increasing dan-
ger to the public's health and safety . . . [a] pointless distinc-
tion." 42 Moreover, he rejected the majority's belief that the
37. Id. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that the waste dispo-
sal law was not preempted and that garbage was to be treated as an article of
commerce which is thus entitled to commerce clause protection. The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term - Leading Cases, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 58 (1978).
38. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626. Justice Stewart suggested that eco-
nomic and environmental concerns were among the objectives of the Commerce
Clause. Id. He was not particularly alarmed with the possibility of economic pro-
tectionism stating that "New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' pock-
etbooks as well as their environment." Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that City of Philadelphia
was the "first decision to find 'protectionism' without also finding impermissible
economic motivation." The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Leading Cases, 92 HARV. L.
REV. at 61 (1978).
For cases finding a legitimate aim of legislation as an acceptable means, see
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 522-24 (to assure steady supply of milk); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928)(to create jobs by keeping industry
within state); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941)(to preserve
state's financial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants).
40. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 630-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41. For discussion of quarantine exception, see infra notes 55-59 and ac-
companying text. Justice Rehnquist specifically described the potential hazards
which arise from waste deposits. First, in New Jersey, "virtually all sanitary land-
fills can be expected to produce leachate, a noxious and highly polluted liquid
which is seldom visible and frequently pollutes . . . ground and surface waters.
The natural decomposition process which occurs in landfills also produces large
quantities of methane and thereby presents a significant explosion hazard.
Landfills can also generate 'health hazards caused by rodents, fires and scaven-
ger birds' and, 'needless to say, do not help New Jersey's aesthetic appearance
nor New Jersey's noise or water or air pollution problems.'" Id. at 630.
42. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 633. The distinction between solid and
9
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continued availability of state landfills for endogenous waste
proves that the hazardous waste is not inherently harmful.43
B. The Pike "Balancing Test"
Once challenged legislation is deemed to be evenhanded, an
inquiry is made into the extent of the statute's burden on inter-
state commerce. The United States Supreme Court in the seminal
case of Pike v. Bruce Church,44 set forth a "balancing test" [the Pike
balancing test] to be applied to legislation which, although bur-
dening commerce, regulates evenhandedly. Under the Pike bal-
ancing test, legislation which regulates evenhandedly will be
upheld so long as the state's regulatory interest outweighs the in-
terference with interstate commerce. 45 Generally, the Court will
take into account the nature of the local interest at issue when
determining the extent of the burden on interstate commerce. 46
C. Exceptions to the Per Se Discrimination Rule
In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,47 the Supreme Court noted
that there may be instances where a state's legislation, although
discriminatory in nature, is nonetheless, valid. 48 Specifically, the
hazardous waste has not yet been recognized by the courts. There is perhaps a
much stronger argument that hazardous wastes are, in fact, more inherently
dangerous than solid waste.
43. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 633. Specifically, Rehnquist noted that
"[tihe fact that New Jersey has left its landfill sites open for domestic waste does
not ... mean that solid waste is not innately harmful." Id.
44. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). With respect to the balancing test the Court
states in pertinent part:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate lo-
cal public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
Id. (quoting Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). Notably,
Huron is the leading Supreme Court decision addressing an environmental pro-
tection provision which is juxtaposed with the Commerce Clause. Ira Steven
Lefton, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause: Local Discrimination in Environmental Pro-
tection Regulation, 55 N.C. L. REV. 461, 466 (1977).
45. Under the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test, the regulation must not be
excessively burdensome on interstate commerce.
46. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
47. 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In Dean Milk, the Court reviewed a city ordinance
which limited the importation of milk into the city. Id. Specifically, the ordi-
nance required that any milk sold in the city be pasteurized within a five mile
radius of the city. Id. at 350. Although the Court recognized the legitimate po-
lice power interest in providing the city with healthy milk, it eventually struck
down the statute on the grounds that there were less discriminatory means avail-
able. Id.
48. Id.
10
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Court noted that discriminatory state legislation may be upheld if
it acts as a legitimate police power or if there are no less discrimi-
natory alternatives. 49 Armed with this principle, the Court has
carved out a number of exceptions50 to the general treatment of
discriminatory legislation under the Commerce Clause.
Generally, the courts seem to give greater deference to dis-
criminatory legislation predicated on health and environmental
concerns. 5' For example, in Mintz v. Baldwin,52 the Supreme
Court upheld a state requirement that imported cattle be certified
in order to prove that they did not carry a particular contagious
disease. 53 The Mintz case exemplifies the Court's apparent will-
ingness to tolerate legislative measures which are motivated by
local interests as opposed to economic interests. 54
In an environmental context, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently refused to designate municipal solid waste as being "inher-
ently dangerous" 55 at the time of importation. Under the
"quarantine exception," the presumption of per se invalidity56
49. Dean Milk, 340 U.S. at 352 (1951). See also, Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)(Supreme Court reaffirms Dean
Milk holding).
50. An example of a well-recognized Commerce Clause exception which
has been successfully applied to waste import bans is the market participant
exception.
The leading waste import ban case which applied the market participant
exception is Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
Lefrancois involved a state subsidized central landfill, which was the only landfill
in the state which accepted certain types of solid waste. Id. The district court
held that a state, as a "market participant," may prohibit the disposal of exoge-
nous waste at a state-subsidized sanitary landfill where there were no privately-
owned alternative disposal sites. Id. The court reasoned that "[i]n operating the
Central Landfill, Rhode Island has done nothing more than purchase a natural
resource, i.e., the landfill site, and offer to its customers the service of waste
processing." Id. at 1211. See also County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens,
473 A.2d 12 (Md. Ct. App. 1984)(county owned public landfill exemplified mar-
ket participant rather than market regulator role and thus was free from Com-
merce Clause scrutiny).
For a discussion of the market participation exception in the waste import
context, see generally William L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market
Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services - Fair Competition or the Destruction of the
Private Sector?, 18 ENVTL. L. 779 (1988).
51. See TRIBE, supra note 22, at 415.
52. 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
53. Id. at 347. The state was concerned with Bang's disease.
54. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 415. See also American Can Co. v. Oregon Li-
quor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 697 (Or. App. 1973) (Oregon Bottle Bill
requiring all soft drinks and beer sold in Oregon to be packaged in returnable
containers).
55. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
56. For a discussion of the quarantine exception, see infra notes 161-67.
19921 159
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may be overcome if it can be shown that the article of commerce
was "inherently dangerous." In Maine v. Taylor,57 the Supreme
Court upheld the discriminatory legislation at issue, focusing on
the "inherently dangerous" nature of the objects of commerce. 58
Thus far, the Court has not similarly reviewed the possibility that
the degree of harm associated with hazardous waste may be dis-
tinguished from that of municipal solid waste. If this distinction
were recognized by the Court, hazardous waste would then be
designated an "inherently dangerous" category. 59
D. State-Imposed Import Bans
In response to the unequal distribution of hazardous waste
disposal among the states, several states have imposed blockades
to the free flow of solid and hazardous wastes within their bor-
ders. 60 This section will address hazardous waste bans imposed
by state and local governments which are distinguishable from
the total import ban on solid waste at issue in the City of Philadel-
phia holding. Specifically, this section will address: (1) local ordi-
nances, (2) differential fees and (3) black list reciprocity laws.
1. Local Ordinances
Recently, many courts have questioned whether local ordi-
nances6' should be considered under the less stringent Pike test
57. 477 U.S. 131, on remand, United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 441 (1st Cir.
1986).
58. Id.
59. For a discussion of the possible distinction between solid and hazard-
ous waste, see infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
60. Examples of states which have pending or enacted legislation involving
waste disposal restrictions are South Carolina, Mississippi, Utah and Alabama.
In 1988, the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council provided a list of twenty
states which have restrictive siting laws. 19 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 739 (Aug. 26,
1988)(noted in Stone at 3).
In the 1970's and early 1980's, state interest arose with respect to waste
import limitations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1701 (Michie Supp. 1981);
1973 La. Acts 78, [repealed and replaced by The Louisiana Environmental Af-
fairs Act, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:1051-1150 (West Supp. 1983)]; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2253 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-A, B, C, & D
(Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:119-1110 (WEST 1979), repealed by L. 1981, c.
78, § 1 (West Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2764 (West 1973), repealed
by L. 1981, c. 322, § 17 (West Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.1-1 To 21
(1979)(sTATurTEs noted in Cain, supra note 19, at 767 n.2).
61. Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir.
1987). It is well established that "[a] municipality's acts affecting interstate com-
merce are subject to the constraints of the Commerce Clause." Evergreen, 820
F.2d at 1484 (9th Cir. 1987) (referring to White v. Massachusetts Council of Con-
str. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206 (1983) ("scrutinizing Boston city hiring
policy for Commerce Clause violation")).
12
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which balances the burden that the regulation places on interstate
commerce against the particular regulatory interest of the state.62
In addition, the courts have not resolved the issue of whether a
distinction between a partial or total ban by a political subdivision
is dispositive in determining a discriminatory or evenhanded
application.63
In the context of waste management, court decisions have
generally clung to the City of Philadelphia holding and classified
most local bans as discriminatory. 64 However, the Ninth Circuit
in Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service District 65 ig-
nored this precedent and applied the less stringent Pike balancing
test. 6 6 The court reasoned that " 'evenhandedness' simply re-
quires that out-of-state waste be treated no differently from most
62. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For a further discussion of the Pike balancing test,
see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
63. If such a distinction exists, the less stringent Pike balancing test would
be applied to partial import bans and thus exempt local legislation from a
heightened scrutiny analysis. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For a discussion of the recent
case history of local waste disposal bans, see Meltz, supra note 31. This article
generally discusses solid waste import bans. Although hazardous wastes are dis-
cussed in this article, no distinction is made between hazardous and solid waste.
64. See Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C.
1984)(local ordinance enjoining importation of exogenous waste was found to
be valid); Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 438 A.2d 269
(1980) (local ban which controlled transportation and depositing of various haz-
ardous and toxic wastes and radioactive materials within county held to imper-
missibly discriminate against articles in interstate commerce). But see Monroe-
Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Town of Caledonia, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 78
(1980) (local ordinance distinguishable since landfill operator provided evidence
that it had not and would not accept exogenous waste).
65. 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
66. Even if the court had found the ban to be discriminatory on its face, the
balancing test would still have been applied because the state was a market par-
ticipant. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not dwell on this fact, but instead,
emphasized the evenhandedness of such legislation.
In the context of solid waste, a plaintiff in a case before a Michigan district
court urged that the court should not have relied on Evergreen. Bill Kettlewell
Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.
Mich. 1990). The plaintiff argued that Evergreen is of "marginal precedential
value . . . in light of the district court's finding that the defendant acted as a
market participant ..., and was therefore exempt from commerce clause cover-
age [anyway]." Id. at 766, n.2. Yet, the Sixth Circuit, affirmed the district court's
Bill Kettlewell holding by finding that the ordinance regulated evenhandedly, and
that its burdens on interstate commerce were not clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich.
1990). See also, Omni Group Farms, Inc. v. County of Cayuga, 766 F. Supp. 69
(1991) (district court held that local law banning importation of solid waste from
outside county withstood Commerce Clause attack); County of Washington v.
Casella Waste Management, Inc., 1990 WL 208709 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)(local re-
striction on importation of solid waste from outside county upheld).
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. . . [in-state] . . . waste."' 6 7 Accordingly, the court held that the
challenged ordinance did not "fit the Court's paradigm of a per se
violation" 68 since it also applied to in-state waste. 69 The Evergreen
rationale was subsequently applied to a similar Commerce Clause
challenge. 70
2. Differential Tipping Fees and Taxes
Recently, a federal district court struck down a tipping fee
imposed by an Ohio statute7' on out-of-state waste as a violation
of the Commerce Clause. 72 The statute imposed an assessed vari-
able fee determined by the cost that would have been charged if
the trash had been deposited in its state of origin. 73 The Ohio
statute applied to solid waste.
In addition to the partial ban on hazardous waste discussed
in the section below, the state of Alabama has also recently im-
posed a higher tax on all out-of-state waste coming into the state.
Specifically, the state imposes a $72/ton fee on all out-of-state
waste.7 4 On July 11, 1991, the Supreme Court of Alabama up-
held the statute75 as a valid way to protect state resources and
reduce the risks of waste transport.7 6 On January 27, 1992, the
United States Supreme Court agreed to review the Alabama tax
on exogenous waste. 77 The Court is expected to decide on the
67. Evergreen, 820 F.2d at 1484.
68. The Evergreen court defined a "per se violation" as "a law that overtly
blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders." Id.
69. Id.
70. See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Re-
sources, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), 732 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990). A
political subdivision had imposed a ban on intrastate and interstate waste. Id. at
762. The court, citing Evergreen, similarly held that the ordinance was even-
handed. Id. at 765-66. District Judge James Harvey's opinion considered the
implications of Maine v. Taylor upon the case before the court. 477 U.S. 131, on
remand, 802 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1986).
71. OHIo REV. CODE § 3734.131 and § 3734.57.
72. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp.
244 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
73. Id.
74. "States Fight For Rights", CHEMICAL WEEK 56 (August 21, 1991).
75. Act No. 90-326, ALA. CODE 1975, § 22-30B-1 (Supp. 1990).
76. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 1991 WL 151546 (Ala.
1991).
77. Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, cert. granted (U.S. Jan. 27, 1992)
(No. 91-471). It is interesting to note that if the Alabama Supreme Court deci-
sion is overturned in the United States Supreme Court, the waste management
industry users of the Emelle facility may receive a refund of over $30 million in
tax payments from the state of Alabama. CHEMICAL WEEK (July 24, 1991).
Moreover, the Supreme Court's ruling could have a significant impact on other
states such as "New York, Louisiana, and South Carolina, along with a host of
14
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issue by the summer of 1992.
At a recent meeting in August, 1991, the National Governors
Association (NGA) expressed their support for the imposition of
differential fees as a way to decrease the amount of hazardous
waste transported across state lines. 78 The NGA proposed that
there be a five-year transition period for capping differential fees
in order to prevent states from imposing a de facto import ban.79
They suggested that the federal government set forth a formula
for a maximum allowable fee during this transition period.80
3. Blacklist Reciprocity Laws
State-imposed reciprocity requirements which burden inter-
state trade pose similar potential conflicts with the Commerce
Clause. 81 Challenges often arise about whether reciprocity re-
quirements will survive the "strictest scrutiny" which is applied to
facially discriminatory laws.8 2 Outside the context of waste man-
agement, traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence has gener-
ally struck down such legislation as per se invalid. 83 For example,
the Court rejected as discriminatory a state regulation which en-
joined the importation of milk from those states which did not
reciprocally import its milk.84 More recently, the Supreme Court
local governments [which] have sought to limit the influx of wastes into their
borders ...... Geoffrey A. Campbell, High Court to Decide on Constitutionality of
Taxes on Hazardous Waste in Alabama, THE BOND BuYER, January 28, 1992, at 5. See
also Paul M. Barrett, High Court to End Waste-Disposal War, WALL ST. J., March 23,
1992, at BI.
. 78. Governors Clarfy Stand on Waste Import Fees, Back Selective Bans, INrE-
GRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT (Sept. 4, 1991).
79. Id.
80. Id. "After the five years, the governors oppose limiting fees charged by
one state for accepting another state's waste." Id.
81. For a discussion of the impacts of reciprocity agreements which present
blockades to interstate trade, see Meltz, supra note 31.
82. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
83. Id. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976)(Mississippi regulation proscribing importation of milk from states which
did not reciprocally accept Mississippi milk violates Commerce Clause);
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) on remand, State ex rel. Douglas v.
Sporhase, 329 N.W.2d 855 (1983)(Nebraska statute barring exportation of water
to any state failing to grant reciprocal rights to withdraw and transport ground
water to Nebraska flies in face of Commerce Clause).
84. Great Atlantic, 424 U.S. 366. In Great Atlantic, the Supreme Court re-
fused to accept the argument that the regulation at issue maintained the state of
Mississippi's health standards. The Court noted that even if another state's
health standards were inferior to Mississippi's standards, the other state's milk
would still have to be imported by Mississippi so long as the other state had
entered into a reciprocity agreement. See Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264,
1266 (10th Cir. 1978).
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rejected an Ohio statute awarding a sales tax credit for ethanol
gas "sold by dealers if it was produced in Ohio or in a state ac-
cording similar tax treatment."85
Although the Supreme Court has not yet wrestled with a reci-
procity issue as it applies to waste management,8 6 a few lower
courts have considered the issue. a7 In Hardage v. 4tkins,8 8 the
Tenth Circuit analyzed an Oklahoma reciprocity statute and
struck it down as violative of the Commerce Clause. 9 Specifi-
cally, the Oklahoma law precluded the importation of any indus-
85. Meltz, supra note 31, at 8 (citing New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269 (1988) [hereinafter New Energy]). In NSWMA H, however, the appellant's in-
terpretation of New Energy differed. According to Chemical Waste Manage-
ment's brief in NSWMA II, "such partial bans (reciprocity agreements) are
facially discriminatory and unlawful." Brief for Appellants at 27-28, NSWMA H,
910 F.2d 713 (9th Cir.).
86. It is interesting to note that the European Economic Community's
(EEC) waste initiatives will require that waste be disposed of at the closest site to
its origin. For a discussion of the new EEC initiatives and the "proximity princi-
ple" which they are based on, see generally Paul Luiki, European Community Waste
Policy: At the Brink of a New Era, International Environment Daily (BNA)(July 30,
1991).
87. The Supreme Court recently refused to review Alabama's Holley Bill
which is essentially a reciprocity statute. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Management
v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
88. 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871
(10th Cir. 1980)(subsequent decision).
89. Hardage, 582 F.2d at 1266. The Tenth Circuit specifically tested the
validity of Oklahoma Statute § 2764. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2764 (West
1978) (noted in Hardage 582 F.2d at 1265). That section precluded the importa-
tion of controlled industrial waste from states which did not impose substantially
similar standards for disposal as those required in Oregon. See generally David
Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindus-
trial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309
(1989)[hereinafter Pomper]. In his article, Pomper rejects the reasoning in
Hardage stating the following:
[I]mplicit, however, is an argument that any attempt to reshape the in-
centives surrounding other states' legislative decisions is illegitimate.
The Tenth Circuit appears to have been moved by this argument in
striking down an Oklahoma law excluding hazardous industrial wastes
originating in states that had not enacted 'substantially similar stan-
dards' for their disposal. This argument makes no sense in the modem
legal universe that gives the states power to decide whether to adopt a
free market or regulatory approach. Every regulation and every regula-
tory vacuum shapes the incentives affecting other political entities.
Oklahoma's neighbors could as easily be accused of enacting laissez-
faire standards for hazardous waste disposal that 'reach[] out and seek[]
to force the enactment' by Oklahoma of a statute with low standards
similar to their own. Given this relativity, to label a state as an aggres-
sor solely because it is the first to move from laissez-faire to regulation
is to turn the commerce clause back into a tool for exposing state gov-
ernments to the efficiency-maximizing wind stirred by the mobility of
capital.
Pomper at 1344 (citations omitted).
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trial waste from "[another state], unless the state of origin.., has
enacted substantially similar standards 90 for controlled industrial
waste disposal . . ., and has entered into a reciprocity agreement
with the State of Oklahoma." 9 1
In contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently upheld a
similar waste disposal reciprocity requirement. In response to the
waning capacities of a local landfill and the failure to complete
replacement landfills, the state of New Jersey enjoined the landfill
from receiving waste92 from any area except neighboring towns
and those towns with reciprocity agreements. 93 The state
supreme court held that the statute passed constitutional muster
since it was determined to be "balanced and fair" and thus did
not rise to the level of impermissible protectionism. 94
Recently, the state of Alabama enacted a reciprocity require-
ment which was reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of
Envtl. Protection.95 Unlike the Oklahoma statute at issue in Hardage
which had imposed specific state standards, the Alabama law was
predicated on federally enacted legislation regarding capacity as-
surance requirements. 96 Breaking the limited precedential treat-
ment of reciprocity requirements, the Alabama district court
90. The legitimacy of this requirement has been questioned. "Even if
Texas had higher standards than Oklahoma for the disposal of controlled indus-
trial waste, such waste could not be shipped into Oklahoma unless Texas en-
tered into a reciprocal agreement." Hardage 582 F.2d at 1266.
91. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2764 (West 1978) (noted in Hardage 582 F.2d
at 1265).
92. As in City of Philadelphia, the regulation in Glassboro v. Gloucester County
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders similarly pertained to solid waste. For consideration of
the distinctions between solid and hazardous waste, see infra note 157-60.
93. See generally, Stone, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. at 18.
94. Glassboro, 485 A.2d at 303.
95. NSWMA I, 729 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1990). For a discussion of the
reciprocity requirement as it applies to the district court analysis, see Meltz, supra
note 31.
96. For a discussion of § 104(c)(9) of SARA's capacity assurance require-
ments, see supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
In 1989, South Carolina passed a law which precluded the importation of
waste for disposal from states which "refused to take steps to dispose of it itself,
thus effectively banning thirty-two states and Puerto Rico." South Carolina Bars
32 States on Disposal of Hazardous Waste, Washington Post, March 1, 1989, at A7,
col. 5. See Stone, 15 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. at 2. South Carolina's actions are distin-
guishable from other states. Generally, the state was provoked to take action by
a recent North Carolina law which, in effect, prohibited siting of commercial
treatment facilities in the southern part of the state. North Carolina's action was
"really rooted in local opposition to accepting 'large amounts of waste from a
nearby [South Carolina] superfund site.' " Stone, at 2. See also 18 Envtl. Rep.
(BNA 1757) (Nov. 20, 1987).
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upheld the statute. 97 Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed, confining itself to the traditional Commerce Clause
"highly scrutinized" analysis.98 The following sections will con-
sider the reasoning which prompted both courts' decisions.
IV. THE ALABAMA CASE
A. Case History
Owners of the nation's largest hazardous waste facility where
toxic waste is buried for a fee, Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
["Chem Waste"], 99 brought a joint action with National Solid
Waste Management Association ["NSWMA"] in an Alabama dis-
trict court challenging the constitutionality of a newly enacted
statute.' 00 At issue was the amended section 22-30-11 of the
Alabama Code' 0 ' which was popularly labeled the Holley
97. NSWMA I, supra note 8.
98. NSWMA II, supra note 8.
99. NSWMA I, supra note 8, at 797.
100. For a discussion of the Supremacy Clause challenge, see supra note 19.
The plaintiffs raised several issues. Appellants in NSWMA II not only challenged
the constitutionality of the Holley Bill, but they also challenged the state im-
posed emergency preapproval regulations and land disposal restriction regula-
tions. NSWMA II, supra note 8, at 722-25.
101. Section 22-30-11 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The department, acting through the commission, is authorized to
promulgate, and may revise when appropriate, rules and regula-
tions, guidelines, criteria and standards for all hazardous waste
management practices.
(b) It is unlawful for any person who owns or operates a commercial
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facility within this state to
dispose or treat any hazardous wastes generated in any state
outside the state of Alabama which:
(i) Prohibits by law or regulation the treatment or disposal of
hazardous wastes within that state and which has no facility per-
mitted or existing within that state for the treatment or disposal of
hazardous wastes; or
(ii) Has no facility permitted or existing within that state for the
treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes; unless that state has
entered into an interstate or regional agreement for the safe dis-
posal of hazardous wastes pursuant to the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The
department shall establish and maintain a list of states from which
hazardous wastes cannot be accepted for treatment or disposal
pursuant to this paragraph and there shall be no liability under the
paragraph for disposal of wastes from a state until 15 days after a
state has been listed by the department. ...
(c) Subsequent to the effective date of [this Act], no commercial haz-
ardous waste treatment or disposal facility operating in this state
may contract with states other than the state of Alabama in order
to satisfy the capacity assurance programs required by 42 U.S.C.
18
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Bill. 10 2 The bill, enacted in September, 1989, limited, inter alia,
the importation of hazardous waste destined for disposal in Ala-
bama landfills.
Unlike those state import bans which completely abrogate
the influx of articles of commerce, the Alabama ban imposed only
a partial ban affecting those states which do not meet the federally
mandated capacity assurance guidelines under CERCLA section
104(c)(9).103 Specifically, the Holley Bill enjoins Alabama's com-
mercial facilities from receiving hazardous waste from states
which lack their own facility designated for the treatment or dis-
posal of hazardous waste, or states which have not entered into a
§ 9604(c)(9) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended.
(d) For the purpose of this section, the following additional terms are
defined:
(1) AGREEMENT. Any interstate or regional contract agreement
made pursuant to capacity assurance requirements of Section 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604 (c) (9) of CERCLA and which one of the signatories to such con-
tract or agreement is the state of Alabama.
(2) COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT OR DIS-
POSAL FACILITY. A facility which receives for disposal only, or for
treatment and disposal, hazardous wastes that are not generated on-site
and to which facility a fee is paid or other consideration given for such
treatment or disposal.
ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 (1975).
102. The Holley Bill, named after Alabama State Representative Holley,
was intended to apply only to landfilled hazardous wastes. It is important to
note that this form of waste disposal, landfills, has been described by Congress
as the "most threatening to human health and the environment, and represents
the least desirable hazardous waste management technology." H.R. REP. No.
98-198, pt. I, reprinted in 1984 U.S.§ C.C.A.N. 5576, 5591. Addressing the un-
certain dangers associated with land disposal, Congress, in House Report 98-
198, states in pertinent part:
The Committee intends the Administrator to consider the lack of
knowledge of how hazardous wastes behave when land disposal, the
uncertainties regarding the period of time the waste may remain haz-
ardous, the design and management uncertainties involving the long-
term inability of liners and leachate collection systems to prevent waste
migration from the facility, the uncertainties associated with ground
water monitoring, and the institutional uncertainties associated with
isolating the waste from the environment for as long as the waste re-
mains hazardous. The extensive record this Committee and others
have developed on the deficiencies of present land disposal practices
and standards substantiates the Committee's action to restrict land dis-
posal as provided in this section.
Id.
103. ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 (1975). The Holley Bill prohibitions are only
applicable to landfilled hazardous wastes. Thus, for example, "waste solvents
from Florida are still allowed to come to Alabama to be burned or to go through
[a] recycling operation or solvent recovery." Brief for Appellee at 21, n.6,
NSWMA II, supra note 8 (No. 90-7047)(quoting Sue Robertson, the Chief of
ADEM's Land Division).
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CERCLA agreement with the state of Alabama.10 4
The language of section 22-30-11, as amended by the Holley
Bill, reveals that environmental10 5 and fairness106 considerations
were instrumental in its enactment. Addressing the latter con-
cern, the Holley Bill states that Alabama has been accepting a sig-
nificant amount of hazardous waste from states which have not
been doing their fair share under CERCLA. 0 7
In enacting the Holley Bill, the Alabama legislature reasoned
that the bill would motivate affected states to assume greater re-
sponsibility in the management of their exogenous hazardous
waste. The legislature, reconciling the stricter state action with
applicable federal law, noted the following in section 1(5):
Implicit in the CERCLA capacity-assurance procedure is
a recognition that an importing state might refuse to
enter into an agreement with an exporting state, requir-
ing the exporting state to create available capacity
through waste reduction or through siting new facilities,
or enter into an agreement with another state to manage
these wastes.' 0
Opponents of the Holley Bill reject this reasoning, claiming
that such action by a state actually violates federal goals enunci-
ated in the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause.' 0 9 The
following two sections consider the holdings of the federal district
104. NSWMA 1 729 F. Supp. at 800. The district court pointed out that
although twenty-two states and the District of Columbia were adversely affected
by the Holley Bill, 3/10 of 1% of the waste previously disposed of in Alabama
was affected. Id.
105. ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 § 1(2).
106. ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 § 1(4).
107. The Holley Bill, 1975 Ala. Act 89-788, § 1(9) provides as follows:
The constant influx of large volumes of hazardous wastes entering this
state over and through congested state, county, and municipal high-
ways and roads, coupled with the ever-increasing potential for traffic
accidents and mishaps involving hazardous waste transporters, and the
likelihood of leaks, spills, and/or explosions of said hazardous wastes
resulting therefrom, altogether pose an unreasonable and unjustifiable
risk to the health, safety, and welfare of Alabama's citizens;
Id.
108. Id. at § 1(5).
109. As an example, in NSWMA II, the plaintiffs included in their complaint
challenges that the Alabama law violated the "due process, takings, and contract
clauses of the Constitution." NSWMA H, 910 F.2d at 715 n.l. Neither the dis-
trict court nor the Eleventh Circuit addressed these claims in their opinions.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that there was no need to consider these claims
since they were not discussed in the court below. Therefore, the circuit court
was able to "grant . . . [the] requested relief on other grounds." Id.
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court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals with respect to
the Commerce Clause issue.
In reviewing the legality of the Alabama ban, the federal dis-
trict court" 0 upheld the Holley Bill as valid while the Eleventh
Circuit"' subsequently struck down the bill as a violation of the
Commerce Clause. The Eleventh Circuit decision, however, did
not take immediate effect upon its August 1990 decision. Instead,
Alabama continued to enforce the ban while the state sought a
rehearing. On May 10, 1991, the Eleventh Circuit 1 2 refused to
rehear the case. About one month later, the United States
Supreme Court'' then refused to review the circuit court deci-
sion. 114 The following two sections will specifically focus on the
reasoning employed by the Alabama district court and the Elev-
enth Circuit.
B. Federal District Court Decision - No Commerce Clause
Violation
The district court, in reviewing the constitutionality of the
Holley Bill, applied the less stringent Pike balancing test' 15 which
weighs a state's regulatory interest in the legislation against the
amount of interference with interstate commerce. In selecting
the Pike test, the court distinguished itself from the controlling
City of Philadelphia"16 decision. Unlike the total ban imposed in
City of Philadelphia, the Alabama ban did "not have the effect of
closing its borders to all out-of-state waste." 117
Moreover, the Alabama ban was not created with the intent
to hoard a natural resource. The court reasoned that such a ban
"has not forbidden either the passage of out-of-state waste across
its borders or the deposit of such waste.., except for waste com-
ing from nonconforming states." ' 18 Since the Holley Bill differed
110. NSWMA I, 729 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
111. NSWMA II, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990).
112. 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1991).
113. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. Management v. National Solid Waste Man-
agement Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
114. The Supreme Court refused to review the case despite the fact that it
has not yet reviewed the issue regarding a state's ability to restrict imports of
hazardous waste. Environment, Decision Rejecting Alabama Waste Law Will Not Be
Reviewed, Supreme Court Says, Daily Reports for Executives (BNA) No. 112 at A-10
(June 11, 1991).
115. For a discussion of the Pike balancing test, see supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
116. City of Philadelphia, supra note 6.
117. NSWMA I, supra note 8, at 804-05 (emphasis added).
118. NSWMA I, supra note 8 at 804.
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from the statute involved in City of Philadelphia in this respect, it
was distinguishably nondiscriminatory. Weighing Alabama's in-
terest against the interest in the impact of the legislation on inter-
state commerce, the district court's analysis centered upon the
following three factors: public welfare, 1 9 the environment 120 and
fairness. 12 1
Initially, the Alabama hazardous waste ban was intended to
protect the health and welfare of the people. 122 These concerns
probably elevated in proportion to the sharp increases in the ex-
ogenous waste imported by the Emelle facility. 123 Emelle was and
remains the largest landfill site 124 for toxic waste in the United
States.
Second, and tangentially related to the court's concerns for
the safety of Alabama citizens, are the environmental concerns
which exist on a state and national level respectively.' 25 At the
state level, the court was once again concerned with the dangers
posed to the environment as a result of the increase in imported
waste. The court recognized the need for an increase in disposal
capacity nationwide in order to ensure environmentally sound
treatment of the growing levels of hazardous waste. 126 The court
concluded that the Holley Bill reflected the spirit of CERCLA sec-
tion 104(c)(9): to motivate the development of disposal facilities
in states where they are currently lacking.' 27
Finally the district court noted that environmental motiva-
119. For a discussion of public welfare, see infra notes 122-24 and accom-
panying text.
120. For a discussion of environmental concerns, see infra notes 125-26
and accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of fairness argument, see infra notes 128-30 and ac-
companying text.
122. NSWMA I, supra note 8 at 804. The court exhibited a concern for Ala-
bama citizens with respect to the large amount of hazardous waste being
dumped in Alabama. Id.
123. Specifically, the amount of waste increased from "less than 200 million
pounds in 1978 to 682 million pounds in 1985." White, Who Ships Toxic Waste?,
The Birmingham News, Nov. 26, 1989, at 18A, col.l.
124. Id.
125. NSWMA I, 729 F. Supp. at 804.
126. Id. at 799. The Alabama district court noted that the state was, in ef-
fect, compelled to impose such a ban in response to other states which ignore
their responsibility to similarly provide for hazardous waste treatment. Id.
127. See The Holley Bill, 1975 Ala. Act 89-788, § 1(14) which provides in
pertinent part:
The imposition of the requirements contained in this legislation will
encourage the development of new waste disposal facilities in other
states in accord with the intentions of the Congress in enacting Section
42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9), and will have the beneficial effect of reducing,
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tions for states to "clean-up their act"'128 are premised not only
on federal standards, but also upon basic principles of fairness
and justice. The Alabama district court reasoned that since Ala-
bama itself was bearing a significant burden of managing hazard-
ous wastes from so many other states, equity required that those
states which did not similarly bear this burden should develop
new capacity to handle some of their own waste.' 29 To that end,
one of the district court's aims was to prevent Alabama from be-
coming "the dumping ground"' 130 of irresponsible states.
C. Eleventh Circuit - Holley Bill Violated Commerce Clause
On August 8, 1990, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court decision, holding that the Alabama
Holley Bill was a per se violation of the Commerce Clause. l3 '
The court relied heavily on the City of Philadelphia 132 decision in
concluding that Alabama had "attempted to isolate itself from a
problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the move-
ment of interstate trade."' 33
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Edmondson stated that
the district court incorrectly applied the less stringent Pike balanc-
ing test 134 in its analysis. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion focused
on three basic inquiries: articles of commerce, 35 interference
with interstate commerce 3 6 and congressional intent.'37
First, the court concluded that hazardous wastes' 3 8 are, in
in an orderly manner, the nation's dependence on landfilling as a
methodology for disposing of hazardous wastes.
Id.
128. NSWMA 1, 729 F. Supp. at 804.
129. The Holley Bill, 1975 Ala. Act No. 89-788, § 1(4) (emphasis added).
The court concurred with the fairness rationale set forth in the Holley Bill.
130. NSWMA I, 910 F. Supp. at 804.
131. NSWMA H, supra note 8. See generally 21 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 787 (Au-
gust 17, 1990).
132. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
133. NSWMA 11, 910 F.2d at 720.
134. For a discussion of the Pike balancing test, see supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text.
135. NSWMA II, 910 F.2d at 718-19.
136. Id. at 719-21.
137. Id. at 721-22.
138. RCRA defines "hazardous waste" as follows:
[A] solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteris-
tics may -
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality
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fact, articles of commerce' 39 and, accordingly, merit Commerce
Clause protection. The court noted that a state may justifiably
impose restrictions on exogenous articles when the "dangers...
'far outweigh' . . . [an object's] worth in interstate commerce."' 40
However, the circuit court refused to weigh the dangers of haz-
ardous waste more heavily than those associated with solid
waste.' 4 ' Although the court agreed that hazardous waste may
indeed be "innately more dangerous"' 42 than solid waste, the
court nonetheless followed case law of the Eleventh 43 and Tenth
or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible,
illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(5) (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
139. NSWMA H, 910 F.2d at 719. This question was not addressed in the
district court's opinion. It is likely that the Eleventh Circuit Court chose to
devote significant attention to this issue for two reasons. First, in doing so, the
court's analysis more clearly resembled the pattern undertaken in City of Philadel-
phia. Relying on the City of Philadelphia as precedent, the Eleventh Circuit proba-
bly rationalized that such approach would lend credibility to its decision.
Second, the appellee's brief places a great deal of emphasis on the premise
that hazardous waste can be characterized "inherently dangerous." As such, it
would be exempt from Commerce Clause constraints.
140. NSWMA 1I, 910 F.2d at 718 (quoting City of Philadelphia, supra note 6, at
622). Generally, a state may restrict importation when an object's "existing con-
dition .... would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death." Bowman v.
Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888). For example, the
Supreme Court has held that a state act which enjoined the transportation of
"large dead animals" in order to "prevent the spread of disease" was constitu-
tional. Clason v. State of Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 442 (1939).
141. NSWMA II, 910 F.2d at 719. Once again aligning itself with the
landmark Supreme Court decision, Judge Edmondson reasoned that "[although
the hazardous waste involved in this case may be innately more dangerous than
the solid and liquid waste involved in City of Philadelphia, we cannot say that the
dangers of hazardous waste outweigh its worth in interstate commerce." Id. In a
footnote, the Circuit Court's comparison to City of Philadelphia employed a pro-
cess of elimination in order to make the point that the Supreme Court intended
to encompass hazardous wastes within the scope of its holding. Since the Ala-
bama court had explicated "four narrow categories of waste, including garbage
fed to swine and municipal solid waste processed into fuel," all other categories
of waste were impliedly to be considered as articles of commerce. Id. at 719 n.9
(citing City of Philadelphia, supra note 6, at 619 n.2).
142. NSWMA 1I, 910 F.2d at 719.
143. Id. at 719. The court relied on another recent Eleventh Circuit deci-
sion, Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, Alabama ex. rel Siegelman v. United States EPA, 110 S. Ct. 538
(1989). Reliance on this case for a definitive answer, however, is questionable.
With respect to the Commerce Clause issue, Alabama v. United States EPA merely
regurgitated what the Supreme Court had already enunciated in City of Philadel-
phia. Thus, the court's reliance on this case is dubious since it appears to have
simply applied the Supreme Court's conclusions concerning solid waste without
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/7
HAZARDOUS WASTE & PARTIAL IMPORT BANS
Circuits 144 and chose to recognize no inherent danger in hazard-
ous wastes. Moreover, Judge Edmondson argued in dicta that the
Holley Bill itself impliedly concurred with the court's decision
since it did not consider the hazardous waste at issue "hazardous
enough" to impose a total ban on all states.' 45
Concluding that hazardous wastes are within the purview of
the Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Circuit next considered
whether the Alabama ban created a protectionist barrier to inter-
state commerce.' 46 First, the court rejected the argument that
such bans were necessary to comply with the SARA capacity as-
surance requirements. 47 It noted that there were other less re-
strictive ways for Alabama to comply with section 104(c)(9). 148
Second, the selective banning of waste from only some states was
held to be a violative means to effectuate a perhaps legitimate
purpose. 149 Finally, the court rejected the applicability of the
quarantine exception. 150 Noting that the quarantine exception
prevents the traffic of "noxious articles, whatever their origin,"' 5 '
even considering the potential distinguishing features of hazardous waste which
may have existed.
144. In Hardage, the Tenth Circuit ruled that "[the] industrial waste [which
was] defined in the Oklahoma statute as refuse products that are toxic to human,
animal, aquatic, or plant life is within [the] purview of the commerce clause." Id.
at 1266, (noted in NSWMA 11, 910 F.2d at 719). Cf. Meltz, supra note 31.
145. NSWMA 11, 910 F.2d at 719.
146. Under this more scrutinizing analysis, the "crucial inquiry . . . is
whether the Holley Bill is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it is
based on legitimate local concerns with effects on interstate commerce that are
only incidental." NSWMA H, 910 F.2d at 720 (noting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (Supp. V 1987) (originally enacted as
Superfund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104, 100 Stat. 1613,
1782). See NSWMA II, supra note 8.
148. According to the EPA Guidance Doctrine, Alabama may comply with§ 104(c)(9) by any combination of the following three measures:
(1) creating new disposal capacity within the state, (2) entering into in-
terstate or regional agreements allowing Alabama to use capacity
located in other states, and (3) contracting with private waste manage-
ment facilities.
(S. REP. No. 11,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985)) (notedin NSWMA 1I, 910 F.2d at
720). The court presented another alternative for complying with § 104(c)(9)
other than imposing a ban, which was for the state to contract with the private
facility for that capacity. NSWMA II, supra note 8, at 720.
149. Once again, the court quoted the famous City of Philadelphia language:
"the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative
ends." NSWMA II, 910 F.2d at 720 (quoting City of Philadelphia, supra note 6, at
626). With respect to "purpose," the court acknowledged that valid concerns
for human health and the environment may have actually existed in Alabama,
however, such end or purpose did not justify the means.
150. Id. at 720.
151. Id. at 721 (quoting City of Philadelphia, supra note 6, at 629).
19921 173
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Judge Edmondson held that the Holley Bill did not contain a sim-
ilar purpose since it distinguished on the basis of the state of ori-
gin as opposed to on the basis of the level of danger presented by
the waste. 15 2
Generally, a discriminatory barrier to interstate trade may be
upheld by direct congressional authorization;153 but the circuit
court also held that Congress did not intend to authorize states to
impose potentially discriminatory waste disposal bans when it en-
acted CERCLA and SARA section 104(c)(9).1 54 Rejecting the ap-
pellee's argument that the SARA amendments evinced such
congressional intent, Judge Edmondson recognized that section
104 (c)(9) empowered states with greater responsibility to handle
waste disposal. 155 He argued that although SARA did, in fact,
strongly encourage states to assume greater authority, SARA did
not specifically contemplate states closing their borders to inter-
state commerce in order to meet federal hazardous waste man-
agement requirements.1 56
V. ANALYSIS
Several recent Commerce Clause challenges to state-imposed
waste bans have significantly relied upon City of Philadelphia. How-
ever, City of Philadelphia's application has been interpreted too
broadly in the waste management field.
Two distinguishable areas in which City of Philadelphia is ar-
guably not dispositive recently arose in the Alabama Holley Bill
dispute. This section will separately address the Commerce
Clause challenges arising in the Alabama case with respect to the
following areas: (1) hazardous waste in interstate commerce, and
152. Id. at 721.
153. Id. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460
U.S. 204, 213 (1983) ("Where [a] state or local government action is specifically
authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it inter-
feres with interstate commerce") Id. See also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87, on remand, 746 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1984)("Congress
may redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce"). Id.
154. Id. at 721-22.
155. NSWMA II, supra note 8.
156. NSWMA 11, 910 F.2d at 721. Defendants argued that the bans in Ala-
bama were actually having a positive effect in enforcing federal regulations.
This argument was determined to be irrelevant so long as there was, in fact, no
congressional intent to impose the restrictions. Moreover, the court relied on a
Supreme Court holding which denied states the right to "impose penalties on
conduct already penalized under federal statutory scheme." Id. at 721 n.10 (not-
ing Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475
U.S. 282 (1986)).
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(2) partial waste disposal bans. It is suggested that in subsequent
court holdings, these rather specific issues should be indepen-
dently considered as distinguishable from the City of Philadelphia
holding. In addition, a third part of this section will consider the
congressional intent of section 104(c)(9) and the argument that
this section runs concurrent with the Alabama Holley Bill.
A. The Object of Commerce Inquiry
The Eleventh Circuit in NSWMA II completely relied on City
of Philadelphia when analyzing Alabama's Holley Bill under the
strictest Commerce Clause scrutiny. However, the circuit court
failed to distinguish the municipal solid waste at issue in the City
of Philadelphia from the hazardous waste involved in the NSWMA
cases. Accordingly, the circuit court failed to adequately explore
the implications of the quarantine exception.
1. The Solid-Hazardous Waste Distinction
The major distinction between solid waste and hazardous
waste' 57 is the degree of danger each presents. It is well estab-
lished that hazardous waste may "cause ... an increase in mortal-
ity or an increase in serious . . . illness."' 58 Therefore, the
harmful effects of disposed hazardous waste have become increas-
ingly evident in every state.1 59 For example, contamination of
groundwater from hazardous wastes has "led to higher rates of
miscarriage and birth defects, respiratory problems, urinary tract
disease, cancer, or central nervous system disorders in surround-
ing populations." 16o
157. For a listing of hazardous wastes, see 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-4 (1987).
158. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. 6903(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
159. Hazardous wastes in leaking land disposal sites "have contaminated
groundwater supplies with toxic, carcinogenic or otherwise hazardous chemi-
cals." Cain, supra note 19, at 770-71.
160. Cain, supra note 19, at 771. For example, in the Love Canal incident,
studies revealed the following statistics:
[m]iscarriages in women moving into the area rose from 8.5% to 25%.
Children born to families closest to the site suffered birth defects 20%
of the time as opposed to 6.8% of the time in removed areas. Urinary
disease incidence increased by a factor of 2.8, and asthma increased by
a factor of 3.8.
Cain, supra note 19, at 771 n.23 (noting Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal:
Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Pro-
tection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 140-61 (1979)(statement of Dr. B. Paigen)).
17519921
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2. Quarantine Exception
Against this background, it is suggested that hazardous
wastes are more likely to fit into the quarantine exception than
solid wastes. Although the Supreme Court has not yet had the
opportunity to apply the exception to hazardous waste, compel-
ling reasons exist for exempting such articles from Commerce
Clause scrutiny.
Historically, the Supreme Court has upheld the quarantine
exception in order to prevent the introduction of diseased cat-
tle' 6 ' or baitfish 62 into the state economy. Similarly, there exists
a need to protect the lives of humans who are threatened by a
hazardous substance which may cause mortality as well as other
substantial present and future adverse affects on human health. 63
According to the Supreme Court, a necessary component of
the quarantine exception is that the object be inherently danger-
ous at the time of importation. 164 This "pointless distinction"
adopted by the City of Philadelphia holding merely hinges upon the
timing of the danger, not the danger itself.' 65
Moreover, the credibility of such reasoning is questionable
from the standpoint that the substances at issue are intrinsically
harmful. Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist's famous dissent in City
of Philadelphia, in which he frankly disagreed with the "timing" of
the danger reasoning, is particularly compelling in the context of
hazardous waste. 166 Such waste may be handled safely through
161. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902). Reid involved a statute which,
at certain time periods, precluded the importation of uncertified cattle which
had not spent ninety days in quarantine. Id. The statute was upheld as a legiti-
mate police power. Id. The court allowed Colorado to discriminate against cat-
tle on the basis of their origin from certain states below the thirty-sixth parallel
since the purpose of the statute was aimed at preventing the spread of disease.
162. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, on remand, United States v. Taylor, 802
F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1986).
163. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 632 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist, addressing the majority's treatment of hazardous wastes, stated that
he saw "no way to distinguish solid waste .. , from germ-infected rags, diseased
meat, and other noxious items." Id.
164. Id. at 622. Justice Stewart stated that "because the articles' worth in
interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very
movement, States could prohibit their transportation across state lines." Id. (em-
phasis added).
165. Id. at 633 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)(emphasis added).
166. Id. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not revisited City of Philadelphia in
the context of hazardous waste. It is interesting to note that future decisions in
waste management may be affected by the fact that Justice Stewart (who wrote
the majority opinion in City of Philadelphia) is no longer on the Court and Justice
Rehnquist remains as a strong influence.
28
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/7
HAZARDOUS WASTE & PARTIAL IMPORT BANS
treatment or safe transportation; however, it remains inherently
dangerous. 6
7
B. Partial Waste Bans Under Commerce Clause Scrutiny
Assuming that the quarantine exception does not exempt
hazardous waste from constitutional analysis, City of Philadelphia is
distinguishable from partial hazardous waste bans on other
grounds. The issue before the 1978 Supreme Court in City of
Philadelphia involved a total import ban.'16 The issue before the
Eleventh Circuit, however, involved only a partial ban on exoge-
nous waste effectuated by a reciprocity requirement.' 69 It is ar-
gued that the broad holding in City of Philadelphia does not apply
to the narrower factual context present in the Alabama cases.
The Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that Alabama had in-
tended to "isolate itself from a problem common to many by er-
ecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade."' 170
Alabama did not erect a complete barrier, but only a "bypass
mechanism."' 171 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit erred in its automatic
reliance on City of Philadelphia 172 as a basis for holding that the
Alabama's partial ban violated the Commerce Clause. The Elev-
167. No state could completely confine itself from the hazardous waste
market. While a state may achieve total disposal efficiency for one waste, the
need to export other hazardous waste for disposal would remain in most
instances.
Additionally, this author recognizes that the invocation of the quarantine
exception with respect to hazardous waste bans may not be the appropriate al-
ternative. This response may run counter to the stated purpose § 104(c)(9)
which is to maximize national hazardous waste disposal efficiency.
168. For a discussion of City of Philadelphia, see supra note 32-43 and accom-
panying text.
169. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 910 F.2d 713 (11 th Cir. 1990).
170. Id. at 720 (quoting City of Philadelphia, supra note 6, at 628). It is also
submitted that the promulgation of the Holley Bill was not actually a reaction to
"a problem common to many." Id. On the contrary, Alabama was bearing a
large brunt of the burden (in the area of commercial hazardous waste disposal)
on its own. Statistics indicate not only that Alabama was the largest importer of
such waste, but also that much of this imported waste originated in states which
chose not to deal with the problem.
171. It may be argued that exporting states had control over their ability to
export to Alabama. If they failed to take control of the situation by heeding
federal requirements, they gave up their right to export to Alabama.
172. City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Reversing the
district court opinion, the Eleventh Circuit applied a more narrow analysis in its
review of the constitutionality of the Holley Bill. NSWMA II, 910 F.2d at 715.
Judge Edmondson stated that his "job [was] not to make policy." Id. Stating
that he could "only apply the law", Edmondson divorced himself from the "seri-
ous problems associated with hazardous waste management [which] plague our
nation." Id. at 715-16.
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals completely sidestepped the district
court's emphasis on health, environment, and fairness. 173
Generally, reciprocity requirements have been struck down
as impermissible burdens on commerce. ' 74 The rationale is that
they are enacted to promote economic, protectionist purposes. 175
However, it is evident from the facts of both Alabama decisions
that the enactment of the Holley Bill was not predicated upon
economic interests. Thus, it is suggested that the Alabama Holley
Bill was not an economic measure and accordingly, should not
have been subjected to the strict scrutiny Commerce Clause anal-
ysis. Moreover, if the court had used the Pike balancing test,' 76
the minimal effects of the partial ban 177 clearly would not have
outweighed the pressing state concerns. 178
C. Congressional Intent Under Section 104(c)(9)
Perhaps the most compelling argument for upholding a haz-
ardous waste ban, similar in nature to the Alabama Holley Bill,
lies with the Congressional intent in enacting CERCLA section
104(c)(9). 179 The Supreme Court has upheld state laws which
173. For a discussion of these three justifications, see supra notes 115-130
and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
historical judicial treatment of reciprocity agreements.
175. See supra notes 44-46.
176. See New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Flynn, No. 84-1226 (1st
Cir. 1984). Applying the balancing test to state-imposed hazardous waste regu-
lations, the First Circuit found that the requirement that hazardous waste trans-
porters obtain a license was not excessive in relation to costs. The court, in its
balancing analysis, noted the significant number of hazardous material spills.
177. The district court opinion noted that on a national level, "less than
three-tenths of one percent of America's toxic waste gets buried at Emelle."
NSWMA I, supra note 8, at 797. Moreover, "[s]ome of this percentage comes
from states that have complied with federal legislation .... The court, there-
fore, is being asked to decide whether a partial ban on less than three-tenths of
one percent is an onerous burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 797 n.7.
178. For discussion of the legitimate "pressing state concerns" for the pub-
lic welfare, the environment, and standards of fairness present in NSWMA, see
discussion of the district court opinion supra notes 117-130 and accompanying
text.
179. Moreover, the "congressional intent" justification for upholding a
statute would present less problems than an argument posited under the quar-
antine exception. Generally, the latter argument would involve a more compli-
cated analysis including consideration of the burdens imposed on industry.
Under the quarantine exception, subsequent difficult questions regarding treat-
ment of endogenous, hazardous waste would likely arise. Accordingly, a state
would be compelled to justify its ability to treat its own waste and its simultane-
ous rejection of imported waste. This burden of proof, however, would not be
required upon a showing of congressional intent.
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further a federal legislative purpose. The Court has recognized
that even when Congress has explicitly legislated in a particular
area, states are not foreclosed from enacting laws promoting that
federal purpose. 18 0
Congress promulgated section 104(c)(9) with the intent to
stimulate greater self sufficiency among states.'l ' Alabama's Hol-
ley Bill seems to be consistent with this goal since it, in effect,
forces states to comply with the capacity assurance requirements
in section 104(c)(9). If the implementation of such reciprocity re-
quirements is deemed to effectuate an impermissible burden on
commerce, l8 2 the state action must still arguably be permissible if
Congress intended to authorize it. l83
VI. CONCLUSION
The framers of the Constitution wrote the Commerce Clause
in order to promote interstate trade. 8 4 The negative implica-
tions of the Commerce Clause have been construed by the United
States Supreme Court as an effort to prevent economic protec-
tionism.' 8 5 Under the Commerce Clause, the federal government
is required to intervene in state affairs in order to prevent eco-
nomic, protectionist regulation.
In contrast, the authors of SARA section 104(c)(9) intended
to promote state self-sufficiency in the area of hazardous waste
disposal. 186 They were motivated by non-economic, environmen-
tal and safety concerns. Under section 104(c)(9), states
themselves are encouraged to take more sedulous roles in imple-
menting new disposal programs and facilities.
180. Decanas v. Bica, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974), cert. granted 422 U.S. 1040
(1975), rev'd 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Although this case involved a labor issue, it is
analogous to states' response to the congressional enactment of § 104(c)(9).
State legislation mirroring § 104(c)(9) may actually be even more convincing
than the Decanas case since the specific purpose of section § 104(c)(9) was to
promote state action.
181. Former EPA Administrator, Lee Thomas, specifically stated that
"states would become increasingly active partners in making Superfund work."
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
182. Despite the apparent infringement on interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court in dicta has stated that "sanitation" is a "traditional governmen-
tal function." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976).
183. The underlying premise of the Commerce Clause is that Congress
may expressly refuse to apply it to a particular state statute which would other-
wise be struck down in violation of the Clause.
184. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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These two goals have recently clashed in the context of par-
tial hazardous waste bans. It is suggested that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in reviewing this conflict, failed to properly reconcile the two
legitimate goals.
Generally, lower courts have been striking down state-im-
posed barriers to hazardous waste under the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court has refused to review the area of partial im-
port bans on hazardous waste. 187 However, the Supreme Court
has recently agreed to review the related issue regarding the con-
stitutionality of state taxes on exogenous waste.' 88 The basic ra-
tionale supporting the legality of partial waste impost bans also
applies to taxes on exogenous waste imposed by importer states.
A Supreme Court ruling on such states taxes will likely influence
the outcome of future decisions regarding partial waste import
bans. Without the partial waste ban option, importer states such
as Alabama, which are unfairly overburdened, will eventually
"drown" in their "collective" hazardous garbage.
Christine M. Fixl
187. In the National Solid Waste Management case, the Supreme Court re-
cently denied certiorari. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Alabama
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 729 F. Supp 792 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, 910 F.2d 713
(1 th Cir.), modified on denial of reh'g, 924 F.2d 1001 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management v. National Solid Waste Management
Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
188. Chemical Waste Management Inc. v. Hunt, cert. granted (U.S. Jan. 27, 1992)
(No. 91-471). See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of
state taxes on exogenous waste.
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